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NOTES AND COMMUNICATIONS
COMPETITION IN THE DUTCH MORTGAGE MARKET
1 INTRODUCTION
The scale of European banking institutions has changed over the last two
decades. Due to internationalisation, deregulation, and liberalisation of ﬁnan-
cial markets in especially the eurozone, market concentration of the European
banking sector has increased substantially. Consolidation applies to the ﬁnan-
cial industry in general, but it holds particularly for the banking sector. In
this paper I focus on the consequences of concentration for a speciﬁc bank-
ing market, the market for mortgage loans in the Netherlands. In general a
mortgage market might be concentrated because of its ‘geographical’ nature.
As Degryse and Ongena (2005) show, distance and lending activity are related
in speciﬁc banking markets. The issue of concentration is important in the
Netherlands. Three large banks, Rabobank, ABN AMRO Bank, and ING,
have a market share of about 70 percent. Together with the Belgian–Dutch
Fortis bank, these three institutions are inﬂuential players on Dutch bank-
ing markets. The mortgage market, with the market for loans to small- and
medium-sized enterprises and the deposit market, is object of analysis of the
Dutch competition authority (NMa (2003)). The main concern is whether
the high market concentration leads to collusive pricing. Since collusion is
hard to detect (Motta (2004)), I focus on econometric tools to signal lack of
competition in the mortgage market.
Before turning to the mortgage market itself, I ﬁrst discuss the general
knowledge about bank concentration. Table 1 denotes the number of credit
institutions in different EU countries as of December 2001 and December
2005 and the Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index (HHI) of the European loan
markets in 1993 and 2002. The table tells two stories. Table 1 reveals that
in France, Germany, the UK, and certainly the Netherlands the number of
credit suppliers has decreased substantially since the start of the euro, which
could indicate an increase of bank concentration in general. Although the
number of institutions as such does not reveal speciﬁc banking market com-
petition fully, its change illustrates the consolidation battle. Table 1 includes
the HHI for the loans market based on individual bank observations from
the Bankscope data set, as compiled by Maudos and de Guevara (2005). The
HHI, measuring the sum of squared market shares, ranges from 0 (inﬁnite
amount of ﬁrms) to 10,000 (one ﬁrm). Values of the HHI below 1000 are
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TABLE 1 – BANK CONCENTRATION IN THE EU
Number of credit institutions Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index
December 2001 December 2005 1993 2002
Austria 851 831 742 368
Belgium 133 117 1057 1645
Denmark 207 200 1742 1112
Finland 392 393 2490 2384
France 1715 1491 431 489
Germany 2577 2148 214 180
Greece 103 95 3137 1446
Ireland 253 320 2099 872
Italy 873 851 310 317
Luxembourg 634 554 359 717
Netherlands 574 411 1963 1207
Portugal 216 191 700 1573
Spain 546 507 463 514
Sweden 180 233 1210 1047
United Kingdom 499 440 755 555
Sources: Number of credit institutions: European Central Bank: www.ecb.de;
Herﬁndahl-Hirschmann Index of the loans: Maudos and de Guevara (2005)
generally seen to be consistent with a lack of market concentration. HHI’s
between 1000 and 1800 are indicating limited concentration, while values
above 1800 indicate concentrated markets. Table 1 shows that the Dutch mar-
ket for loans in the aggregate is less concentrated in 2002 than in 1993. It is
good to note that this result applies to the loans market in the aggregate and
not to the market of concern in this note, the mortgage market, for which
concentration data is not available. In the past, international institutions like
the OECD (2000) and the Group of Ten (2001) have documented, debated,
and shown concern about the consequences of the ﬁnancial merger move-
ment. There is serious concern for both competition and stability effects (see
Carletti et al. (2002)). According to Carletti et al. concentration has in some
cases led to a deterioration of a previously concentrated industry (as in Bel-
gium, France, and The Netherlands).
The Dutch mortgage market is typically a market that should be
carefully monitored, as previous research has shown. Mojon (2000) argues
that the pass-through of ofﬁcial interest rate changes into bank mortgage
rates in the Netherlands is about half the Euro-zone average. I note that this
ﬁnding may reﬂect the fact that Dutch mortgage contracts have a rather high
maturity as compared to other European countries, but as is shown below,
the Mojon concern is still relevant. Toolsema and Jacobs (2007), using macro
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data, conclude that there is asymmetric pass-through of funding costs into
mortgage interest rates in the sense that Dutch banks tend to increase inter-
est rates instantly when costs rise, while waiting to lower the rates when costs
drop. If so, consumers will not beneﬁt. According to Corvoisier and Gropp
(2002) the market power hypothesis at least applies for customer and mort-
gage loans of euro area banks in general and so for the Netherlands in par-
ticular. Kok So¨rensen and Werner (2006) ﬁnd there is a considerable power
in so-called pass-through of the funding rate on the mortgage rate for the
Netherlands (and Germany) and that adjustment toward equilibrium price
setting has slowed down in recent years. This ﬁnding also becomes apparent
in the initiative of the Dutch competition authority NMa in its Monitor of
the Financial Sector (NMa (2003)). In the 2003 report the NMa comments
on the loss of consumer welfare due to possible market power in the mort-
gage market and concludes that competition in the Dutch mortgage market
is an issue of concern. On the other hand De Haas et al. (2000) conclude in
a broad study that there is sufﬁcient competition in the Dutch banking sec-
tor. This ﬁnding is probably intuitive to Dutch agents that enter the mortgage
market, because there is an overwhelming number of intermediaries (not only
private banks) that offer a wide variety of products.
I comment on methods to detect and survey the implications of a lack
of competition in the Dutch mortgage market. In section 2 I shortly review
the macroeconomic relevance of the housing and mortgage markets in the
Dutch economy. It is illustrated that even short-run distortions from competi-
tive results can lead to substantial consumer losses. Given the long-run nature
of the average Dutch mortgage contracts (and the contractual agreements
that support the longevity), mispricing either leads to costly prepayment of
existing contracts or too high debt servicing burdens. Next I review old and
new methods to detect market power using price data (see section 3). The
focus is on relatively new approaches that center around price leadership and
sluggishness in adjustment of interest rates, possible collusion effects, espe-
cially in cases of cheaper funding costs. I illustrate the issue of price leader-
ship in the Dutch mortgage market and conclude with policy implications in
section 4.
2 HOUSING AND MORTGAGES IN THE NETHERLANDS
In the Netherlands about 6.6million houses represent a total value of more
than 1300 billion euro in 2005. 3.6million houses are privately owned and
ﬁnanced for about 40 per cent by mortgage loans. Private housing wealth has
increased substantially since 1985, mainly due to the real price increase up to
2004 by 268 percent (based on data supplied by the Bank for International
Settlements). Although house ownership is rather low in the Netherlands (see
Catte et al. (2004), who show that in the eurozone only Germany has a lower
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owner ratio) residential mortgage debt as a percentage of GDP is quite large
(about 80 percent in 2002) and the typical loan-to-value ratio is high (90
percent is typical). The macroeconomic sensitivity to the housing (and its
ﬁnancing) market is therefore supposed to be substantial.
Using evidence for multiple economies several authors ﬁnd that compar-
ing the impact of equity and housing price shocks, the latter typically have a
stronger impact on output (Catte et al. (2004), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004),
Otrok and Terrones (2005), and Chirinko et al. (2004)). The main argu-
ments given are that the marginal propensity to consume out of housing
wealth is larger than its equivalent out of ﬁnancial wealth, and house own-
ership is more widely spread than equity ownership. Table 2 presents esti-
mated marginal propensities to consume out of ﬁnancial and housing wealth
for a selected number of countries as produced by Catte et al. (2004, p. 16).
Catte et al. estimated error correction models of private consumption in abso-
lute levels and used the sample means to calculate the marginal propensities
to consume. One can observe that the housing ﬁnance channel is most rel-
evant for the UK and the Netherlands. Table 3 gives an overview of hous-
ing market and mortgage market indicators (Catte et al. (2004)). From the
last column of this table one can observe that house ownership in the Nether-
lands is rather low compared to other EU economies. The high sensitivity to
housing wealth changes makes the Dutch economy more vulnerable, which is
partly compensated by its alleged lower impact via ownership. But in general
these facts also stress the vulnerability of Dutch consumption to (the costs
of) housing price shocks. Financial fragility or vulnerability in the sense of
Bernanke and Gertler (1999) could lead to serious distributional effects to
consumption of shocks to the housing markets, especially for those house-
holds that are highly leveraged. Even if bank competition would be perfect,
ﬁnancial fragility could lead to large swings in private consumption. Van
Rooij (2002) addresses this issue for the Netherlands and concludes that espe-
cially newcomers in the housing market experience this ﬁnancial fragility. He
shows that a decrease of the housing prices has an impact on a substantial
part of the houseowners, especially those with a loan-to-value ratio over 100
percent. So, given the importance of the housing market for the Dutch econ-
omy, special care should be given to the costs of ﬁnancing. Compared to
other economies the Dutch mortgage indebtedness is large (and has grown
substantially in the last decades) and the Dutch loan-to-value percentage is
rather high. Moreover, the maximum loan-to-value ratio exceeds the other
maximum rates. The short-run sensitivity is dampened due to the long matu-
rities of the loans, but as Jacobs et al. (2005) show, early prepayment of
mortgages in speciﬁc cases has become normal (though expensive).
Tables 2 and 3 illustrate that there is a serious macro sensitivity to shocks
in the housing market in the Netherlands. What about the sensitivity to
cost changes at the micro level? A back on the envelope calculation of the
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TABLE 2 – SHORT- AND LONG-RUN MARGINAL PROPENSITIES TO CONSUME
Short-term Long-term
Housing Financial Housing Financial
France .. .. .. 0.02
Germany .. 0.01 .. 0.02
Italy .. 0.01 0.01 0.01
Netherlands 0.02 .. 0.08 0.06
Spain 0.01 .. 0.02 0.02
United Kingdom 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.04
Source: Catte et al. (2004)
TABLE 3 – MORTGAGE AND HOUSING MARKET INDICATORS
Residential mortgage Typical (maximum) Loan term Owner occupation
debt 2002 (1992) loan-to-value rate 2002 (1980)
Austria − (-) 60 (80) 20–30 56 (52)
Belgium 27.9 (9.9) 83 (100) 20 71 (59)
Denmark 74.3 (63.9) 80 (80) 30 51 (52)
Finland 31.8 (37.2) 75 (80) 15–18 58 (61)
France 22.8 (21.0) 67 (100) 15 55 (47)
Germany 54.0 (38.7) 67 (80) 15 42 (41)
Greece 13.9 (4.0) 75 (80) 15 83 (75)
Ireland 36.5 (20.5) 66 (90) 20 77 (76)
Italy 11.4 (6.3) 55 (80) 15 80 (59)
Luxembourg 17.5 (23.9) −(80) 20–25 70 (60)
Netherlands 78.8 (40.0) 90 (115) 30 53 (42)
Portugal 49.3 (12.8) 83 (90) 15 64 (52)
Spain 32.3 (11.9) 70 (100) 15 85 (73)
Sweden 40.4 (37.5) 77 (80) <30 61 (58)
United Kingdom 64.3 (55.5) 69 (110) 25 69 (58)
Source: Catte et al. (2004)
consumer loss due to too high costs of mortgage ﬁnancing leads to the
following conclusions. Suppose that due to market power a consumer faces
a cost of funding of a redemption free mortgage product that is 50 basis
points too high. Using a house price of 200 thousand euro and a typical loan-
to-value ratio of 90 percent this leads to an annual before-tax loss of 900 euro
per year (depending on income this loss can be lowered to about 450 euro
due to the special role of mortgages in the Dutch taxing system). But with
an average mortgage interest rate of 5 percent this 10 percent increase of
the costs leads to a lower valuation of the 20 thousand euro private wealth
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with about 2 thousand euro. Given a marginal propensity to consume out
of housing wealth of about 0.08 (see also Poterba (2000), for estimates of
marginal propensities to consume) another 160 euro lower annual consump-
tion will be the result. For the average household this is a serious loss of
disposable income, which justiﬁes serious testing of excessive proﬁt margins
on mortgage products. Two comments should be made. First, in 2004 86
percent of the mortgage products had a ﬁxed interest rate. With a typical
long-run (30 year term) ﬁxing the too high interest rate seriously affects dis-
posable income. A second remark needs to be made with respect to the type
of mortgage products. Annuity and linear mortgages were popular instru-
ments in 1995 (24 percent market share), but in 2004 only made a share of
6 percent (van Dijkhuizen (2005)). Savings (22 percent) and investment (25
percent) products are more popular and allow for cushioning of interest rate
effects. The highly popular interest-only products have a market share of 40
percent in 2004 and allow for maximum tax beneﬁts.
3 REVIEW OF COMPETITION TESTING
The debate on competition effects of bank concentration focuses on the
conﬂict between two competing so-called structural hypotheses. The Structure-
Conduct Performance (SCP) paradigm (Mason (1939)) relates a reduction in
competition with increases in market power. Contrary, the efﬁcient-structure
(ES) paradigm (Demsetz (1973)) states that differences in market concentra-
tion reﬂect efﬁciency of growing ﬁrms. Antitrust agencies focus on these price
effects of concentration and have concern for a reduction of consumer surplus
(see Motta (2004)). It is hard though to support or reject either SCP or ES
(see e.g. Bikker and Haaf (2002), Bikker (2004) for a detailed overview).
Instead of relating market competition and Lerner indexes, more recent
work, in the so-called non-structural class, concentrates on testing proﬁt-
ability on the bank level in the Panzar–Rosse model or a speciﬁc bank-
ing market in the so-called Bresnahan–Lau test (see e.g. Bikker (2003)). The
Panzar–Rosse test measures the sensitivity of bank proﬁt to changes in input
prices. It is assumed that banks operate in the long-run equilibrium, face a
demand for their products with an elasticity larger than unity, and a homo-
geneous cost structure. Bikker and Haaf (2002) ﬁnd for the Netherlands that
there is perfect competition among large banks, but imperfect competition
among small and medium-sized banks. The main disadvantage of the PR-
test is that it applies to the institutional level and not the product market
level. The Bresnahan-Lau test is a conjectural variations model and tests for
the impact of competitor price changes on own pricing policies (see Bikker
and Haaf (2002), Bikker (2003) for an extensive survey of results for e.g.
the Netherlands for the loan and deposit markets). The studies do not ﬁnd
a rejection of the hypothesis of perfect competition for the Dutch market
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for loans. Toolsema (2003) also ﬁnds support for competition on the Dutch
market for consumer loans. De Haan and Sterken (2006) estimate a version
of the Bresnahan–Lau-model for the loans market for 5-and 10-year contracts
at the bank level (see also Coccorese (2005)) and conclude that all banks
behave competitively. Given the lack of further evidence of these well-known
approaches for the Dutch case I do not discuss these methods any further
here and conclude that there is insufﬁcient evidence of imperfect competition
in mortgage markets so far.
As Carletti et al. (2006) show, high bank concentration leads to higher
input efﬁciency, say a better access to the (larger) interbank money market
or other funding markets on the one hand. Then it is an empirical matter
whether this cost efﬁciency is transmitted into lower lending rates. Next I
focus on these price considerations and address the issue of uncompetitive
pricing and maybe even collusion. How sensitive is the Lerner index for cost
changes? The literature on pass-through of interest rates is appropriate: how
fast is the change in the selling price after a shock to the cost price? I focus
on three elements in this discussion:
1. Are cost price changes reﬂected in long-term pricing policies?
2. Are cost price changes transmitted one-to-one in selling prices?
3. Are cost price changes passed on in a symmetric way?
Kok So¨rensen and Werner (2006) give a clear view on the ﬁrst two items for
EU economies for various bank retail markets. They ﬁnd that only for saving
deposits there is no clear long-term relation between the retail rate and the
market rate. This might be due to national regulations. For the mortgage mar-
ket they ﬁnd stable long-run equilibrium (co-integration) relations between
the mortgage lending rate and the market interest rate. Toolsema and Jacobs
(2007) also support a long-run equilibrium relation using aggregated data for
the Netherlands. Using a recent daily dataset of the four large players on the
Dutch mortgage market (1997–2003), De Haan and Sterken (2005) also con-
ﬁrm co-integration of Dutch mortgage and market rates. Cost price changes
are found to be reﬂected in long-term pricing policies. Next the issue whether
cost changes are transmitted one-to-one is relevant. Consider the model:
rML =αrM +β +  (1)
where rML is the interest rate on mortgage loans, rM is the market interest
rate (on the same maturity), α is the pass-through parameter, β is the spe-
ciﬁc markup (representing the risk) and  is an error term. One would expect
α =1, but values of α larger than one might signal overshooting, and values
of α smaller than one represent limited pass-through. Both over- or under-
shooting are the result of market imperfections, but need not to reﬂect solely
market power (but can be founded by for instance asymmetric information
as well). Kok So¨rensen and Werner argue that overshooting might be due
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to credit risk factors reﬂecting asymmetric information between banks and
borrowers. They ﬁnd for the Netherlands a pass-through parameter of 1.33,
implying that there could be informational problems, like credit risk factors
as suggested by Kok So¨rensen and Werner. Den Butter et al. (1977) found
also a large long-run pass-through parameter of 1.24 in the sample 1960.2–
1974.1. De Haan and Sterken (2005) on the other hand ﬁnd a value of α less
than one for individual bank interest rates. Jacobs and Toolsema also ﬁnd a
value less than one: 0.90, again indicating incomplete transfer of costs. Using
a recent sample, based on a newly published data set of the Dutch central
bank (starting on a monthly basis from January 2003 to April 2006), I ﬁnd
for the relation between the macro interest rate on mortgage contracts with a
maturity of 10 years or more and the most recent 10-year government bond
interest rate a value α=0.89. See Table 4 for a more complete description of
the long-run equation between the 10-year mortgage market interest rate and
the 10-year funding rate.
Next it is interesting to analyse the speed of adjustment to the steady state
equation. If this speed of adjustment is high, it could reﬂect higher compet-
itive pressure. Now we can get two cases that resemble each other: a fast
adjustment to a limited pass-through and a slower adjustment to a com-
plete pass-through. Kok So¨rensen and Werner ﬁnd that the mortgage mar-
kets in the EU should be considered to have a rather fast adjustment toward
its long-run relation on average. But Toolsema and Jacobs (2007) ﬁnd for
TABLE 4 – ECM ESTIMATION RESULTS FOR 10-YEAR CONTRACTS












S.E. of regression 0.066
Durbin–Watson 1.856
Wald test: F -statistic (p-value)
H0 :ω+ =ω− v H1 :ω+ =ω− 6.071 (0.019)
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the Netherlands lower values of adjustment toward the long-run equilibrium.
Cost increases might be followed faster than cost decreases. Frost and Bow-
den (1999) present evidence of asymmetric pricing for the New Zealand mort-
gage markets, but ﬁnd more upward than downward rigidity (which is ben-
eﬁcial to consumers). Allen et al. (1999), Haney (1988), and Toolsema and
Jacobs (2007) ﬁnd evidence of asymmetric pricing in the mortgage market
though. In an Error Correction Model we can represent asymmetric adjust-








where ω+,ω− <0 and  are the residuals from the long run equation (1) and
νt is a white noise residual. The superscripts + and − refer to the positive
part and negative part of the time series, so that
X+t =
{
Xt if Xt >0





0 if Xt >0
Xt if Xt <0
(4)
The ﬁrst two terms in equation (2) are current and lagged capital market
interest rate increases and decreases, respectively. The number of lags are
for decreases, m, and for increases, n. It is possible that there is asymmet-
ric adjustment to the capital market interest rate changes, so-called amount
asymmetry in the short run. I deﬁne short-run amount asymmetry as the case
where
∑
λ+ =∑λ−. Second, the adjustment process toward the long run can
be asymmetrical. This so-called adjustment asymmetry is present if ω+ =ω−.
The basic hypothesis is that the amount and adjustment asymmetries will be
more relevant for a market participant that is relatively strong. For exam-
ple, a powerful bank will not immediately lower its interest rate after a cost
decrease in order to increase proﬁts. Toolsema and Jacobs (2007) and De
Haan and Sterken (2005) ﬁnd indeed evidence for asymmetric adjustment on
the macro level and individual large bank level respectively for the Nether-
lands. De Haan and Sterken ﬁnd stronger evidence of asymmetry for 5-year
contracts, but more competitive results for 10-year contracts. Using the recent
monthly data set over 2003–2006 for the 10-year maturities I ﬁnd a signiﬁcant
adjustment asymmetry (see Table 4, for maturities of 5–10 year I ﬁnd similar
results), but not amount asymmetry (see the unique λ-estimate in Table 4).
The asymmetry points at competitiveness for 5- and 10-year contracts at the
macro level though, since downward adjustments are stronger than upward
moves to the long-run equilibrium. Concluding, the ﬁrst two indicators of
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pass-through do not uniformly reveal evidence of market power, but there is
some evidence of asymmetric pricing policy.
This brings the overview of testing competitiveness in the Dutch mortgage
market to the last step: testing price leadership. Given the fact that four large
banks dominate the Dutch mortgage market, there might be one of these
banks that acts as a price leader. The fact that one bank may act as a price
leader does not imply that the followers do not set interest rates competitively
though. On the other hand price leadership is not seen as a market orga-
nization that appeals to perfect competition. There are three views on price
leadership:
• Barometric price leadership: the price leader is the bank that responds
more quickly than its rivals to changing costs and demand conditions,
but does not in itself have signiﬁcant market power. The price leader acts
as a barometer for the rest of the banking industry.
• A dominant ﬁrm and competitive fringe of smaller ﬁrms. The dominant
bank sets its own price providing a price umbrella for the other banks.
In such a case market performance depends on relative costs and ease of
market entry.
• Collusive price leadership. Coordination of pricing is viewed to be likely
to be feasible only in industries that are highly oligopolistic, where prod-
ucts are close substitutes, with active barriers to entry, and banks face
similar cost conditions.
Rotemberg and Saloner (1990) observe that barometric and dominant ﬁrm
models are often inappropriate for industries in which equal-sized players sell
differentiated products. In such industries one expects strategic behaviour by
all players. If one bank for instance possesses superior information about
demand, the less informed players might ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to follow he
leader. It is likely that price leadership leads to price stickiness. Motta (2004)
argues that collusion is more likely in concentrated markets, especially with
equal strong players. This would hold for the case of the large three Dutch
banks.
De Haan and Sterken (2006) test for price leadership using the data for
both 5-and 10-year maturity mortgage contracts of the four large supplying
banks. Using daily data they ﬁnd clear evidence of price leadership by one of
the banks, based on both an impulse-response analysis of a Vector Error Cor-
rection Model and a probit analysis of infrequent interest rate changes. Given
the fact that interest rates are indeed changed infrequently, but in most cases
in rather short time intervals, the model results appeal to both dominant and
collusive price leadership. Using the same interest rate data set with informa-
tion on market shares, De Haan and Sterken also estimate a conjectural vari-
ations model that signals competitive pricing though.
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Summarizing the non-structural approaches, I come to the following
conclusions:
1. The Dutch market for mortgage loans is a competitive market in the
long run.
2. Pass-through of cost changes is close to one-to-one, conﬁrming the pre-
vious conclusion. There is also evidence that in recent years trans-
mission of costs has increased. Whether this is due to competition or
technological innovation is unclear.
3. In the short run there might be asymmetries in the adjustment pro-
cesses toward the long-run equilibrium. This can imply that in some
cases cost increases are followed more directly than cost decreases.
4. There is evidence of a price leader in the Dutch mortgage market.
Price leadership is not a bad case in itself, but might be caused by corre-
sponding marginal cost changes, mixed strategies, and product heterogene-
ity. But if price leadership signals collusive agreements, there is a serious task
for antitrust authorities. As Motta (2004) shows, collusion is hard to detect.
First, in the real world it is likely to observe advertised prices instead of effec-
tive contract interest rates (see also the data used in De Haan and Sterken,
(2006)). Contract interest rates are typically hard to observe. Second, it is
difﬁcult to determine the monopoly price. Third, even if we know the monop-
oly price, how close should the actual interest rates on mortgage loans be to
the monopoly rate? And if consumers are willing to pay the high markups,
there is no case for antitrust authorities. Motta discusses the issue of paral-
lel pricing as well. Instead of looking at price levels, he argues to look at the
dynamics of interest rates. But even although parallel pricing sounds suspect
(may be even combined with best price policies) it is no proof of collusion.
Only if there is formal proof of communication between banks, one could
establish the existence of collusion. So, as Motta (2004) argues, econometric
methods like the ones discussed above are complementary tools in the process
to detect imperfect competition instead of conclusive proof.
4 POLICY CONCLUSIONS
European banking markets have become more concentrated. For competition
authorities concern about local ﬁnancial consumer markets has increased.
The Dutch market for mortgage loans is such a market (NMa (2003)). In
this note I discuss old and new econometric methods to detect lack of com-
petition, price leadership, or collusion in interest rate setting by large private
banks. I argue that some of the tests indeed hint at non-competitive pricing
policies, without formally giving proof of collusion. It is argued that Stackel-
berg pricing can be the result of dynamic competitive pricing strategies and
is therefore not harmful as such. But price leadership can also be the result
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of collusion. Detecting price leadership therefore should warn the Dutch
antitrust authorities to monitor the market for mortgage loans. This moni-
toring is complicated though because, ﬁrstly, the market for mortgage loans
is quite heterogeneous with respect to its product types. Differentiated prod-
ucts are available, which does not imply that collusion is absent. Under differ-
entiated products, deviation from the agreed rates is costly. A deviant bank
cannot expect to gain considerable market share from rivals unless it cuts
interest rates substantially. Second, the initial sales of mortgage products to
consumers is to a substantial amount the activity of specialized intermedi-
aries. This implies that the marketing channels of mortgage loans are rather
indirect, complicating serious control. And third, as explained, there can be
differences between advertised and contractual interest rates on mortgage
products. Consumers search for the cheapest offer made for their individ-
ual needs. This makes control of the advertised rates troublesome and would
require insight into private contract data. Despite these drawbacks, competi-
tion in the Dutch mortgage market should be on the agenda of policy makers,
competition authorities, and academic economists.
Elmer Sterken∗
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